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Abstract
Empirical research often cites observed choice responses to variation that
shifts expected discounted future utilities, but not current utilities, as an intu-
itive source of information on time preferences. We study the identification of
dynamic discrete choice models under such economically motivated exclusion
restrictions on primitive utilities. We show that each exclusion restriction
leads to an easily interpretable moment condition with the discount factor
as the only unknown parameter. The identified set of discount factors that
solves this condition is finite, but not necessarily a singleton. Consequently, in
contrast to common intuition, an exclusion restriction does not in general give
point identification. Finally, we show that exclusion restrictions have nontriv-
ial empirical content: The implied moment conditions impose restrictions on
choices that are absent from the unconstrained model.
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1 Introduction
Identification of the discount factor in dynamic discrete choice models is crucial for
their application to the evaluation of agents’ responses to dynamic interventions. It
is, however, well known that the discount factor is not identified from choice data
without further restrictions (Rust, 1994, Lemma 3.3, and Magnac and Thesmar,
2002, Proposition 2). Consequently, empirical researchers usually fix the discount
factor at some a priori plausible value, e.g. 0.95, or impose ad hoc functional form
assumptions that allow it to be identified and estimated. These approaches solve
the identification problem, but often lack economic justification. Inferring the time
preferences in the specific context of an application is important as discount factors
have been estimated to vary substantially across choice contexts and populations
(Frederick et al., 2002).1
In this paper, we explore identification from observed choice responses to varia-
tion that shifts expected discounted future utilities, but not current utilities. Such
variation is commonly cited in applications as an intuitive source of information on
time preferences. For example, in studies of green technology adoption, Bollinger
(2015) and De Groote and Verboven (2018) argued that firms’ and households’ cur-
rent choice responses to regulation that shifts their future expenses, but not their
current expenses, are informative about discount factors. In a study of demand
for game consoles, Lee (2013) assumed that the discount factor is identified from
variation in the expected quality of future releases, which shifts future values with-
out affecting current payoffs. In an application to cellphone plan choice, Yao et al.
(2012) argues informally that utilities can be identified in a terminal period when
the choice problem is static. The discount factor can subsequently be identified from
choices in the next to last period. Chung et al. (2014) appeals to Yao et al. (2012)’s
idea in a study of salesforce compensation plans. We give further examples from the
literature in Section 3.5.
In Section 3, we formalize the intuition in these studies as an exclusion restriction
on primitive utilities. We first consider a stationary model with infinite horizon (in-
troduced in Section 2). We prove that, in contrast to common intuition, an exclusion
restriction on primitive utilities does not generally point identify the discount fac-
tor. It does however narrow the identified set— the set of observationally equivalent
discount factors— to a discrete and, if we exclude values near one, finite set. This
set contains the solutions to a moment condition that only involves the discount
1Frederick et al. also showed that geometric discounting is often rejected in data in favor of
present biased time preferences. We study the identification and estimation of hyperbolic discount
functions in Abbring et al. (2018).
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factor and that has a straightforward interpretation in terms of choice responses to
variation in expected discounted future utilities. The moment condition can be used
directly in estimation, independently of the rest of the model parameters.
We subsequently provide a finite upper bound on the number of discount factors
in the identified set for the case in which the states display finite dependence, as
defined by Arcidiacono and Miller (2011, 2017). Examples include optimal stopping
and renewal problems, which we show to be point identified.
We extend our analysis to nonstationary models with finite horizons, which are
commonly used in labor applications (Eckstein and Wolpin, 1989 and Keane and
Wolpin, 1997 are early examples). We show that, with exclusion restrictions, the
discount factor is generally identified up to a finite set in these models.
In Section 4, we explore the empirical content of exclusion restrictions. Magnac
and Thesmar’s Proposition 2 implies that dynamic discrete choice models without
exclusion restrictions cannot be falsified with data on choices and states. In that
sense, the models have no empirical content. We show that exclusion restrictions
impose nontrivial restrictions on the data, which can be tested.
Finally, in Section 5, we argue that common intuition often supports multiple
exclusion restrictions, which imply multiple moment conditions. These moment
conditions share the true discount factor (if one exists that rationalizes the data) as
one solution, but may have individually more solutions. We discuss how standard
(set) estimators can be applied to this case.
This paper’s main contribution is to provide a simple and intuitively appeal-
ing analysis of identification of discount factor in dynamic discrete choice models
under economically motivated exclusion restrictions. Our analysis complements a
substantial literature in econometrics (see Rust, 1994 and Abbring, 2010, for re-
views). Magnac and Thesmar’s Proposition 4 established point identification based
on a different type of exclusion restriction than ours: the existence of a pair of states
that affects, in some specific way, expected discounted future utilities, but not the
“current value,” which is a difference in expected discounted utilities between two
particular choice sequences. This is a high level exclusion restriction that is difficult
to interpret and hard to verify in applications. In particular, unlike our exclusion
restriction, it does not formalize the common intuition that is given in applications
like those discussed above. Empirical applications often incorrectly cite Magnac and
Thesmar’s result as one for an exclusion restriction on primitive utility. For example,
in a study of housing location choice, Bayer et al. (2016, p. 921) wrote
Magnac and Thesmar (2002) . . . showed that dynamic models are identi-
fied with an appropriate exclusion restriction— in particular, a variable
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that shifts expectations but not current utility. In the context of our
framework, lagged amenities provide exactly this sort of exclusion re-
striction: while current utility depends on the current level of the ameni-
ties provided in a neighborhood, lagged amenity levels help predict how
amenities will evolve going forward and thus contribute to expectations
about the future utility associated with that choice of neighborhood.
We show how Bayer et al.’s exclusion restriction can be used to set identify and
estimate the discount factor, even if it is insufficient for point identification.2
Magnac and Thesmar’s identification result relies on a rank condition that en-
sures sufficient variation in expected discounted future utilities. This rank condition
does not suffice for point identification with our exclusion restriction on primitive
utilities. We do however use natural extensions of this condition to ensure local iden-
tification of myopic preferences, which is needed for our discrete set identification
result.
Magnac and Thesmar’s Proposition 2 implies that, without further restrictions,
not only the discount factor, but also the utility of one reference choice can be
normalized without restricting the observed choice and transition probabilities. In-
tuitively, discrete choices only identify utility contrasts, not levels. However, coun-
terfactual choice probabilities, which are often the objects of interest in dynamic
discrete choice analysis, are generally not invariant to the choice of reference utility
(Norets and Tang, 2014; Kalouptsidi et al., 2016). This suggests that we do not only
treat the discount factor, but also the utility of the reference choice as a free param-
eter that should be determined from data. Indeed, we view the identification of the
reference utility as an important, but separate problem from the identification of
the discount factor. For expositional convenience, we derive our main results under
the normalization that the reference utility equals zero. In the appendix, we show
that our results straightforwardly extend to the case in which the reference utility
is known up to a constant shift.
We emphasize that the idea of using exclusion restrictions to identify time pref-
erences in choice models is not ours, but has circulated in the literature for a while.
One early example is Chevalier and Goolsbee (2009), which studied demand for
textbooks. Its choice model implicitly excluded the expected future resale price of
a textbook from the current period pay-off to identify a discount factor. Fang and
Wang (2015) studied identification of dynamic discrete choice models with partially
naive hyperbolic time preferences under explicit exclusion restrictions similar to the
ones we use. In Abbring and Daljord (2019), we show that its main generic iden-
2We thank John Rust for this example.
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tification result is void: It uses a definition of generic identification that does not
preclude the possibility that the model is nowhere identified. We also show that its
proof is incorrect. It therefore has no implications for the identification of the model
with hyperbolic discounting or its special case with exponential discounting, which
we study.
Komarova et al. (2017) showed point identification of the discount factor under
parametric assumptions on the utility function in a model like ours, but without
exclusion restrictions. Norets and Tang (2014) demonstrated that in a model with
parametric utility, point identification is lost to set identification when the distri-
bution of unobservables is allowed to deviate from a known one such as the type-1
extreme value specification that underlies logit choice probabilities. Without any re-
strictions on the distribution of unobservables beyond conditional independence and
absolute continuity, all identification of the discount factor is lost, i.e. the identified
set of discount factors is the unit interval. We instead focus on identification for a
non-parametric utility function under economically motivated exclusion restrictions.
We map each exclusion restriction to an easily interpretable and computable mo-
ment condition that directly informs the identification and estimation of the discount
factor, and the model’s empirical content.
2 Model
Consider a stationary dynamic discrete choice model (e.g. Rust, 1994). Time is
discrete with an infinite horizon.3 In each period, agents first observe state variables
x and ε, where x takes discrete values in X = {x1, . . . , xJ} and ε = {ε1, . . . , εK} is
continuously distributed on RK ; for J,K ≥ 2. Then, they choose d from the set of
alternatives D = {1, 2, . . . , K} and collect utility ud(x, ε) = u∗d(x)+εd. Finally, they
move to the next period with new state variables x′ and ε′ drawn from a Markov
transition distribution controlled by d. We assume that a version of Rust’s (1987)
conditional independence assumption holds. Specifically, x′ is drawn independently
of ε from the transition distribution Qk (·|x) for any choice k ∈ D; and ε1, . . . , εK are
independently drawn from mean zero type-1 extreme value distributions.4 Agents
maximize the rationally expected utility flow discounted with factor β ∈ [0, 1).
Each choice d equals the option k that maximizes the choice-specific expected
discounted utility (or, simply, “value”) vk(x, ε). The additive separability of uk(x, ε)
3Section 3.6 considers an extension to a nonstationary model with a finite horizon.
4Magnac and Thesmar showed that the distribution of ε cannot be identified and took it to be
known. Our type-1 extreme value assumption leads to the canonical multinomial logit case. Our
results extend directly to any other known, continuous distribution on RK .
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and conditional independence imply that vk(x, ε) = v
∗
k(x) + εk, with v
∗
k the unique
solution to
v∗k(x) = u
∗
k(x) + βE
[
max
k′∈D
{v∗k′(x′) + ε′k′} d = k, x
]
= u∗k(x) + β
∫
E
[
max
k′∈D
{v∗k′(x˜) + ε′k′}
]
dQk(x˜|x)
(1)
for all k ∈ D. Here, for each given x˜ ∈ X ,
E
[
max
k′∈D
{v∗k′(x˜) + ε′k′}
]
= ln
(∑
k′∈D
exp (v∗k′(x˜))
)
(2)
is the McFadden surplus for the choice among k′ ∈ D with utilities v∗k′(x˜) + ε′k′ .
Suppose we have data on choices d and state variables x that allow us to deter-
mine Qk(·|x˜) and the choice probabilities pk(x˜) = Pr(d = k|x = x˜) for all k ∈ D
and x˜ ∈ X . The model is point identified if and only if we can uniquely determine
its primitives from these data. As we discuss in Section 4, a version of Magnac and
Thesmar’s Proposition 2 holds: There exist unique (up to a standard utility nor-
malization) values of the primitives that rationalize the data for any given discount
factor β ∈ [0, 1). We therefore focus our identification analysis on β.
The choice probabilities are fully determined by
ln (pk(x˜))− ln (pK(x˜)) = v∗k(x˜)− v∗K(x˜), k ∈ D/{K}, x˜ ∈ X . (3)
The transition probabilities Qk(·|x˜), the value contrasts v∗k(x˜)−v∗K(x˜) for k ∈ D/{K}
and x˜ ∈ X therefore capture all the model’s implications for the data. Hotz and
Miller (1993) pointed out that (3) can be inverted to identify the value contrasts
from the choice probabilities. To use this, we first rewrite (1) as
v∗k(x) = u
∗
k(x) + β
∫
(m(x′) + v∗K(x
′)) dQk(x′|x), (4)
where, for given x˜ ∈ X , m(x˜) = E [maxk′∈D{v∗k′(x˜)− v∗K(x˜) + ε′k′}] is the “excess
surplus” (over v∗K(x˜)), the McFadden surplus for the choice among k
′ ∈ D with
utilities v∗k′(x˜)− v∗K(x˜) + ε′k′ . By (2) and (3), it follows that m(x˜) = − ln (pK(x˜)).
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3 Identification
Let vk, pk, uk, and m be J×1 vectors with j-th elements v∗k(xj), pk(xj), u∗k(xj), and
m(xj), respectively. Let Qk be the J × J matrix with (j, j′)-th entry Qk(xj′|xj) and
I be a J×J identity matrix. Note that the J×1 vector m+vK stacks the McFadden
surpluses in (2). In this notation, the data are {pk,Qk; k ∈ D} and directly identify
m = − ln pK (Arcidiacono and Miller, 2011, Lemma 1 and Section 3.3).
3.1 Magnac and Thesmar’s result
We can rewrite (4) as v∗k(x) = u
∗
k(x) + βQk(x) [m + vK ], where Qk(xj) is the j-th
row of Qk. Subtracting the same expression for v
∗
K(x), rearranging, and substituting
(3), we get
ln(pk(x))− ln(pK(x)) = β [Qk(x)−QK(x)] m + Uk(x), (5)
where Uk(x) = u
∗
k(x) − u∗K(x) + β [Qk(x)−QK(x)] vK is Magnac and Thesmar’s
“current value” of choice k in state x. Its Proposition 4 assumes the existence of a
known option k ∈ D/{K} and a known pair of states x˜1, x˜2 ∈ X such that x˜1 6= x˜2
and Uk(x˜1) = Uk(x˜2). Under this exclusion restriction, differencing (5) evaluated at
x˜1 and x˜2 yields
ln (pk(x˜1)/pK(x˜1))− ln (pk(x˜2)/pK(x˜2))
= β [Qk(x˜1)−QK(x˜1)−Qk(x˜2) + QK(x˜2)] m.
(6)
Provided that Magnac and Thesmar’s rank condition
[Qk(x˜1)−QK(x˜1)−Qk(x˜2) + QK(x˜2)] m 6= 0 (7)
holds, this linear (in β) equation uniquely determines β in terms of the data.
This identification argument can be interpreted in terms of an experiment that
shifts the expected excess surplus contrast [Qk(x)−QK(x)] m by changing the state
x from x˜2 to x˜1, while keeping the current value Uk(x˜1) = Uk(x˜2) constant. The
discount factor is the per unit effect of that observed shift on the observed log choice
probability ratio ln (pk(x)/pK(x)).
A shift in the expectation contrast Qk(x)−QK(x) does not suffice for identifica-
tion. For example, suppose that the exclusion restriction holds for some x˜1, x˜2 ∈ X ,
but that the excess surplus m(x1) = · · · = m(xJ) is constant, so that the expected
excess surplus contrast [Qk(x)−QK(x)] m = 0. Then, a shift in the expectation
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contrast does not shift the expected excess surplus contrast and hence does not
change the decision problem. Consequently, this shift is not informative on β and
Magnac and Thesmar’s rank condition (7) fails.
Rank condition (7) has a meaningful interpretation and is verifiable in data.
The exclusion restriction Uk(x˜1) = Uk(x˜2), however, is more problematic, because it
imposes opaque conditions on the primitives that are hard to verify in applications.
The current values depend on both current utilities and discounted expected future
values. Specifically, they involve elements of vK , which by (4) equals
vK = [I− βQK ]−1 [uK + βQKm] . (8)
The current value is in fact a value contrast between two sequences of choices:
choose k now, K in the next period, and choose optimally ever after, relative to
choose K now, K in the next period, and choose optimally ever after. Because this
particular value contrast does not correspond to common economic choice sequences,
the applied value of Magnac and Thesmar’s restriction is limited. It is hard to
think of naturally occurring experiments that shift the expected contrasts in excess
surplus, i.e. satisfy the rank condition, without also shifting the current value and
consequently violating the exclusion restriction, except for special cases. Indeed, the
intuitive identification arguments in the introduction’s empirical examples do not
involve current values, but exclusion restrictions on primitive utility.
3.2 An exclusion restriction on primitive utility
Like Magnac and Thesmar, we start with (5) or, equivalently,
ln pk − ln pK = β [Qk −QK ] [m + vK ] + uk − uK . (9)
Instead of controlling the contribution of vK to the right hand side with an exclusion
restriction on the current value, we exploit that it can be expressed in terms of the
model primitives. Substituting (8) in (9) and rearranging gives
ln pk − ln pK = β [Qk −QK ] [I− βQK ]−1 [m + uK ] + uk − uK . (10)
Intuition from static discrete choice analysis and Magnac and Thesmar’s results
for dynamic models suggest that, for identification, we need to fix utility in one
reference alternative, say uK . Intuitively, choices only depend on, and thus inform
about, utility contrasts. Thus, following e.g. Fang and Wang and Bajari et al.
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(2015), we set uK = 0.
5 This normalization cannot be refuted by data without
further restrictions (see Section 4). Despite this lack of empirical content, it is not
completely innocuous, as it may affect the model’s counterfactual predictions (see
e.g. Norets and Tang, Lemma 2, and Kalouptsidi et al.). In the appendix, we
demonstrate that our analysis applies without change to the case in which u∗K(x) is
constant, but not necessarily zero, and can straightforwardly be extended to the case
in which u∗K(x) is known up to a constant shift, but not necessarily constant. Thus,
our analysis of the identification of the discount factor complements identification
results for the reference utility u∗K .
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Now suppose that we know the value of u∗k(x˜1)− u∗l (x˜2) for some known choices
k ∈ D/{K} and l ∈ D and known states x˜1 ∈ X and x˜2 ∈ X ; with either k 6= l,
x˜1 6= x˜2, or both. For expositional convenience only (see the appendix for the
general case), we take this known value to be zero, and simply focus on the exclusion
restriction
u∗k(x˜1) = u
∗
l (x˜2). (11)
An advantage of this exclusion restriction over Magnac and Thesmar’s current value
restriction is that it is a direct constraint on primitive utility with a clear economic
interpretation. It also extends Magnac and Thesmar by allowing for restrictions on
primitive utilities across combinations of choices and states.
3.3 The identified set
Under exclusion restriction (11), (10) implies
ln (pk(x˜1)/pK(x˜1))− ln (pl(x˜2)/pK(x˜2))
= β [Qk(x˜1)−QK(x˜1)−Ql(x˜2) + QK(x˜2)] [I− βQK ]−1 m.
(12)
Like (6), this moment condition on β carries all the information in the data about
the discount factor and can be used directly for its identification and estimation.7
5Note that this normalization does not collapse Magnac and Thesmar’s exclusion restriction on
current values to an easily interpretable restriction on primitives.
6Chou (2015) recently provided identification results for dynamic discrete choice models without
a normalization of u∗K . Chou’s results for the stationary model that we study here take the discount
factor to be known. Chou’s Propositions 3, 7, and 8 for a nonstationary model like the one we
study in Section 3.6 provide high-level sufficient conditions for point identification, whereas we
focus on set identification under intuitive conditions. A general difference is that we emphasize the
economic interpretation of the identifying conditions and that we provide results on their empirical
content.
7Obviously, any discount factor that is consistent with the data needs to solve (12); conversely,
for any discount factor that does, primitive utilities can be found that satisfy the exclusion restric-
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Unlike the right hand side of (6), the right hand side of (12) is not linear in β.
Nevertheless, given data on transition and choice probabilities, it is a well-behaved,
function of β. It is therefore easy to characterize the “identified set” B of values of
β ∈ [0, 1) that equate it to the known left hand side of (12).
Theorem 1. Suppose that the exclusion restriction in (11) holds for some k ∈
D/{K}, l ∈ D, x˜1 ∈ X , and x˜2 ∈ X ; with either k 6= l, x˜1 6= x˜2, or both. Moreover,
suppose that either the left hand side of (12) is nonzero (that is, pk(x˜1)/pK(x˜1) 6=
pl(x˜2)/pK(x˜2)) or a generalization of Magnac and Thesmar’s rank condition (7)
holds:
[Qk(x˜1)−QK(x˜1)−Ql(x˜2) + QK(x˜2)] m 6= 0. (13)
Then, the identified set B is a closed discrete subset of [0, 1).
Proof. We need to show that, under the stated conditions, B ⊆ [0, 1) has no limit
points in [0, 1). First note that [I− βQK ]−1 exists for β ∈ (−1, 1) and equals
I + βQK + β
2Q2K + · · · . (14)
This is trivial for β = 0. If |β| ∈ (0, 1), it follows from the facts that |β−1| > 1 and
that QK is a Markov transition matrix, with eigenvalues no larger than 1 in absolute
value. Consequently, the determinant of QK − β−1I is nonzero, so that I− βQK is
invertible and the power series in (14) converges.
It follows that, for given choice and transition probabilities, the right hand side
of (12) minus its left hand side is a real-valued power series in β that converges on
(−1, 1). Denote the function of β this defines with f : (−1, 1)→ R. Corollary 1.2.4
in Krantz and Parks (2002) ensures that f is real analytic.
Denote B∗ = {β ∈ (−1, 1) | f(β) = 0}. Note that B = B∗ ∩ [0, 1). First, suppose
that f has no zeros (B∗ = ∅). Then, B = ∅ has no limit point in [0, 1).
Finally, suppose that f has at least one zero (B∗ 6= ∅). Then, f cannot be
constant (and thus equal zero) under the stated conditions: If the left hand side
of (12) is nonzero then, because its right hand side equals zero at β = 0, f(0) is
nonzero; if rank condition (13) holds, then the derivative of the right hand side of
(12) at β = 0, and therefore of f at 0, is nonzero. Because f is a nonconstant real-
analytic function, its zero set B∗ has no limit point in (−1, 1) (Krantz and Parks,
Corollary 1.2.7). Because B = B∗ ∩ [0, 1), this implies that B has no limit point in
[0, 1).
tion used and that rationalize the data (see Section 4).
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Under the conditions of Theorem 1, each β ∈ [0, 1) that is consistent with (12)
is an isolated point in [0, 1) and thus locally identified. Note that β = 1 is excluded
from the model to ensure convergence of the discounted utility flows. Theorem 1
does not exclude that 1 is a limit point of the identified set. So, the identified set
may contain countably many discount factors near 1. However, because a closed
discrete set is finite on compact subsets, only finitely many discount factors in the
identified set lie outside a neighborhood of 1.
Corollary 1. Under the conditions of Theorem 1, B∩ [0, 1−] is finite for 0 <  < 1.
In many applications, one may be able to argue against discount factors that are
arbitrarily close to 1. Corollary 1 shows that, in such applications, it suffices to
search for the finite number of discount factors in a compact set [0, 1− ] that solve
(12), which is computationally easy.
The right hand side of (12) is the log choice probability difference implied by
the model with an exclusion restriction across choices k and l and states x˜1 and
x˜2. From the proof of Theorem 1, we know it equals the discount factor β, which
represents how much the agent cares about the next period, multiplied by the sum
of two terms that capture how much relevant variation in next period’s expected
discounted utility there is for the agent to care about:
[Qk(x˜1)−QK(x˜1)−Ql(x˜2) + QK(x˜2)] m (15)
and
[Qk(x˜1)−QK(x˜1)−Ql(x˜2) + QK(x˜2)] vK =
[Qk(x˜1)−QK(x˜1)−Ql(x˜2) + QK(x˜2)]
[
βQK + β
2Q2K + · · ·
]
m.
(16)
The first term (15) does not depend on β. It is nonzero if the generalized rank
condition (13) holds. It corresponds to the leading, linear term in the right hand
side of (12), which extends the right hand side of Magnac and Thesmar’s (6) to the
possibility of comparing across distinct choices k and l.
The next section gives conditions under which the second term (16) vanishes.
Section 3.5 gives economic examples in which these conditions hold. If they hold,
the right hand side of (12) is linear in β, so that (12) uniquely determines β under
the generalized rank condition (13).
In general, the second term (16) does not vanish and depends on β. Then, the
right hand side of (12) is not linear in β, but its derivative at β = 0 still equals
the first term (15).8 Therefore, if the generalized rank condition (13) holds, this
8The derivative corresponding to the second term (16) vanishes because choice K has zero value
11
derivative is nonzero and myopic preferences (β = 0) are locally identified.9 In
economic terms, the rank condition ensures that there is variation in next period’s
expected discounted utility for a myopic agent to care about, so that only myopic
preferences can explain a lack of choice response. In Theorem 1, the rank condition
excludes the trivial case that a zero choice response is observed and the right hand
side of (12) equals zero for all β.
In the case that a zero choice response is observed, local identification of myopic
preferences does not rule out that the data are also consistent with some positive
discount factors, as there may be β ∈ (0, 1) such that the sum of (15) and (16) is
zero (that is, there is no variation in next period’s expected discounted utility for the
agent to care about). These discount factors, if any, can easily be found by searching
for the solutions of (12). In particular, if the sum of (15) and (16) is nonzero for all
β ∈ (0, 1), only myopic preferences can explain the lack of choice response.
More generally, rank condition (13) does not suffice for point identification of
β. As the next example demonstrates, the same observed choice response may arise
from a combination of a low β (little care about the next period) and a large absolute
sum of (15) and (16) (lots of variation in the next period to care about) and from a
combination of a high β and a small absolute sum of (15) and (16).
Example 1. Figure 1 plots the left hand side of (6) and (12) (solid black line) and
the right hand sides of (6) (dashed red line) and (12) (solid blue curve) for a specific
example with K = 2 choices, k = l = 1, and J = 3 states. The example’s data
satisfy the rank condition in (13). Under the current value restriction, there is a
unique discount factor that rationalizes the data (the intersection of the black and
the dashed red curve). Under the primitive utility restriction, there are two discount
factors that rationalize the same data (the intersections of the black and the solid
blue curve).
Finally, the rank condition in (13) is not necessary for point identification either.
Example 2. Figure 2 presents an example in which (15) equals zero, so that the
right hand side of (6) and the first (excess surplus) term in the right hand side of
(12) are zero, but the second (value of choice K) term in the right hand side of (12)
is positive and increasing with β. There exists exactly one β ∈ [0, 1) that solves
(12), despite the violation of the rank condition.
if the agent is myopic.
9Here, β is locally identified at some β0 if β = β0 uniquely solves (12) in a neighborhood of
β0. Rank condition (13) is not necessary for local identification of β at zero; for that, higher order
variation of the right hand side of (12) in β at zero would suffice (Sargan, 1983).
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Figure 1: Example in Which the Rank Condition Holds, but Identification Fails
0 0.34 0.95
0
0.0400
β
Note: For J = 3 states, K = 2 choices, k = l = 1, x˜1 = x1, and x˜2 = x2, this graph
plots the left hand side of (6) and (12) (solid black horizontal line) and the right hand
sides of (6) (dashed red line), and (12) (solid blue curve) as functions of β. The data are
Q1(x1) =
[
0.25 0.25 0.50
]
, Q1(x2) =
[
0.00 0.25 0.75
]
,
QK =
 0.90 0.00 0.100.00 0.90 0.10
0.00 1.00 0.00
 , p1 =
 0.500.49
0.10
 , and pK =
 0.500.51
0.90
 .
Consequently, the left hand side of (6) and (12) equals ln (p1(x1)/pK(x1)) −
ln (p1(x2)/pK(x2)) = 0.0400. Moreover, m
′ =
[
0.69 0.67 0.11
]
and Q1(x1) −
QK(x1) − Q1(x2) + QK(x2) =
[ −0.65 0.90 −0.25 ], so that the slope of the dashed
red line equals [Q1(x1)−QK(x1)−Q1(x2) +QK(x2)]m = 0.1291. A unique value of β,
0.31, solves (6), but two values of β solve (12): 0.34 and 0.95.
Also note that there is no value of β that satisfies (6). Even though the data can
be rationalized by some specification of the model, they are not consistent with the
current value restriction. In other words, this restriction has empirical content. We
return to this point in Section 4.
3.4 Finite dependence
Some of the examples in the next subsection display a variant of Arcidiacono and
Miller’s (2011) “finite dependence”. Finite dependence is a property of dynamic
discrete choice models that can considerably simplify estimation and is widely used
in applications (see Arcidiacono and Miller, 2015, for references).
In our context, finite dependence implies that the moment condition is of finite
and known polynomial order. This order provides an upper bound on the number
of solutions for the discount factor in R, and therefore in [0, 1). For example, in the
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Figure 2: Example in Which the Rank Condition Fails, but the Discount Factor is
Identified
0 0.90
0
0.0800
β
Note: For J = 3 states, K = 2 choices, k = l = 1, x˜1 = x1, and x˜2 = x2, this graph
plots the left hand side of (6) and (12) (solid black horizontal line) and the right hand
sides of (6) (dashed red line) and (12) (solid blue curve) as functions of β. The data are
Q1(x1) =
[
0.00 0.25 0.75
]
, Q1(x2) =
[
0.25 0.25 0.50
]
,
QK =
 0.00 1.00 0.000.00 1.00 0.00
0.00 0.00 1.00
 , p1 =
 0.500.48
0.50
 , and pK =
 0.500.52
0.50
 .
Consequently, the left hand side of (6) and (12) equals ln (p1(x1)/pK(x1)) −
ln (p1(x2)/pK(x2)) = 0.0800. Moreover, m
′ =
[
0.69 0.65 0.69
]
and Q1(x1) −
QK(x1) − Q1(x2) + QK(x2) =
[ −0.25 0.00 0.25 ], so that the slope of the dashed
red line equals [Q1(x1)−QK(x1)−Q1(x2) +QK(x2)]m = 0.0000. A unique value of β,
0.90, solves (12), but (6) has no solution.
case with k 6= l = K, (16) reduces to
[Qk(x˜1)−QK(x˜1)] vK = [Qk(x˜1)−QK(x˜1)]
[
βQK + β
2Q2K + · · ·
]
m. (17)
Suppose that Qk(x˜1)Q
ρ
K = QK(x˜1)Q
ρ
K for some ρ ∈ {1, 2, . . .}. That is, the distri-
bution of the state ρ + 1 periods from now does not depend on whether the agent
chooses k or K now, provided that she follows up in both cases by choosing K in the
next ρ periods (independently of whether this is optimal or not). Under this “single
action (K) ρ-period dependence” (Arcidiacono and Miller, 2017) on choices k and
K in state x˜1, Qk(x˜1)Q
r
K = QK(x˜1)Q
r
K for all r ∈ {ρ, ρ + 1, . . .}.10 Now assume
that Theorem 1’s conditions hold. If ρ = 1, the right hand side of (17) equals zero,
10Throughout, we focus on this special case of Arcidiacono and Miller’s (2011) finite dependence,
which turns out to be particularly powerful in our specific context.
14
the current value
Uk(x˜1) = u
∗
k(x˜1) + β [Qk(x˜1)−QK(x˜1)] vK = u∗k(x˜1),
the right hand side of (12) is linear in β, and β is point identified. If instead ρ ≥ 2,
then the right hand side of (17) equals
[Qk(x˜1)−QK(x˜1)]
[
βQK + · · ·+ βρ−1Qρ−1K
]
m,
the right hand side of (12) is a ρ-th order polynomial in β, and the identified set B
holds no more than ρ discount factors. This example straightforwardly extends to
the general exclusion restriction in (11), which we state without further proof.
Theorem 2. Suppose that the conditions of Theorem 1 hold and that {Qk; k ∈ D}
satisfies single action (K) ρ-period dependence on choices k and K in state x˜1,
Qk(x˜1)Q
ρ
K = QK(x˜1)Q
ρ
K ,
and single action (K) ρ-period dependence on choices l and K in state x˜2,
Ql(x˜2)Q
ρ
K = QK(x˜2)Q
ρ
K ,
for some ρ ∈ {1, 2, . . .}. Then there are no more than ρ points in the identified set
B.
Theorem 2 applies finite dependence to cancel differences in expected discounted
utilities across pairs of choices twice, once for each of the two states that appear in
the exclusion restriction. In the special case that the exclusion restriction concerns
a comparison across states x˜1 and x˜2 for a given choice k = l, the right hand side of
(16) reduces to
[Qk(x˜1)−QK(x˜1)−Qk(x˜2) + QK(x˜2)]
[
βQK + β
2Q2K + · · ·
]
m. (18)
By Theorem 2, single action (K) ρ-period dependence on choices k and K in states
x˜1 and x˜2 implies that the identified set contains at most ρ discount factors. If ρ = 1,
then both Uk(x˜1) = u
∗(x˜1) and Uk(x˜2) = u∗(x˜2), (18) equals 0, and the discount
factor is point identified.
In this case with k = l, the consequent of Theorem 2 would also hold if, alterna-
tively,
Qk(x˜1)Q
ρ
K = Qk(x˜2)Q
ρ
K and QK(x˜1)Q
ρ
K = QK(x˜2)Q
ρ
K ,
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for some ρ ∈ {1, 2, . . .}. This is a form of single action (K) ρ-period dependence
on the initial state (instead of the initial choice) under, respectively, choices k and
K. Under one-period dependence on initial states x˜1 and x˜2, current values do not
necessarily reduce to primitive utilities, but it is still true that Uk(x˜1) − Uk(x˜2) =
u∗k(x˜1)− u∗k(x˜2), (18) equals 0, and the discount factor is point identified.
3.5 Examples
Theorem 1 shows that the identified set of discount factors is discrete and, away
from one, finite, but does not establish point identification. Indeed, Example 1
demonstrated that point identification may fail, even if rank condition (13) holds.
Our first two examples below (Examples 3 and 4) illustrate applications from the
literature in which the exclusion restriction is plausibly met, but the discount factor
is not necessarily point identified. We then give two examples (Examples 5 and 6)
of optimal stopping problems with single action one-period dependence, which are
point identified by Theorem 2. Finally, Example 7 demonstrates that single action
one-period dependence is not necessary for point identification. It is a labor supply
model that does not exhibit such one-period dependence, but in which monotonicity
of the moment condition in the discount factor gives point identification.
A number of empirical studies of demand for health care insured under Medicare
Part D base their identification on nonlinearities in the price schedules. Our first
example describes an empirical strategy from this literature in which the primitive
utility exclusion restriction seems plausibly met.
Example 3. As part of an informal identification argument, Finkelstein et al. (2015)
observed that changes in purchase behaviour around kinks in the price of insurance
are informative on time preferences. In the data, insurees pay 25% of additional
expenditures out of pocket as long as their total yearly expenditures range between
$275 and $2510, but contribute 100% to all expenditures between $2510 and $5726.
A myopic insuree would change her spending only after her total spending hits $2510
and her out-of-pocket contributions increase. In contrast, a forward looking insuree
who is close to the kink late in the year would limit her spending before hitting
the increase in contributions. Changes in the propensity to spend towards the end
of the year for those close to the kink are therefore taken to be informative on the
discount factor.
This argument can be represented as an exclusion restriction. Let x be the yearly
expenditure, a state controlled by the choice of filling prescriptions. The utility
uk(x) of a particular drug purchase k is assumed constant for two expenditure levels
16
x˜1 < x˜2 in [275, 2510). Along with variation in expected future expenses because
of the kinked price schedule, the exclusion restriction gives set identification by
Theorem 1.11
The next example is from Rossi (2018) which studied the effect of reward pro-
grams on gasoline sales using a dynamic discrete choice model.
Example 4. In each period, a consumer can choose to buy gasoline (k = 1), or
not (k = K). Consumers accumulate reward points x by registering their gasoline
purchases. The accumulated points can be traded against non-pecuniary rewards
at various point thresholds x. Rossi observed that the purchase frequency is accel-
erating in the accumulated points. By assuming that the current period payoff of
a gasoline purchase at any price y˜ is independent of the accumulated points, i.e.
that uk(y˜, x˜1) = uk(y˜, x˜2) for all y˜ and x˜1, x˜2 ∈ [0, x), the purchase acceleration is
informative on the discount factor. The closer the consumer is to qualify for a given
reward, the less the future reward is discounted. This makes a current purchase
more attractive and predicts a purchase frequency that is increasing in the reward
points.
We next turn to optimal stopping problems. The first example is the bus engine
replacement problem of Rust (1987). Though the plausibility of the exclusion re-
striction is questionable in this particular application, it illustrates how one-period
dependence gives point identification in a well-known application of an optimal stop-
ping model.
Example 5. Rust (1987) studied Harold Zurcher’s management of a fleet of (inde-
pendent) buses. In each period, Zurcher can either operate a bus as usual (d = 1) or
renew its engine (d = K = 2). The payoff from operating the bus as usual depend
on its mileage x since last renewal, which both Zurcher and Rust (1987) observe,
and an additive and independent shock. Renewal incurs a cost that is independent
of mileage and resets mileage to x1 = 0:
QK =

1 · · · 0 0
...
...
...
1 · · · 0 0
 .
In terms of Section 3.4’s finite dependence, mileage is single action (K) one-period
dependent on both initial mileage and the initial renewal choice. Consequently,
11Dalton et al. (2015) used a similar argument to identify salience and myopia in a dynamic
discrete choice model with parametric utility applied to Medicare Part D data.
17
Zurcher’s expected discounted payoffs from renewal do not depend on mileage. In
particular, with our normalization uK = 0, v
∗
K(x˜) = β (m(x1) + v
∗
K(x1)) for all
x˜ ∈ X . Since v∗K(x˜) does not vary with x˜, [Q1 −QK ]vK = 0, and U1(x˜) = u∗1(x˜).
Therefore, if we assume u∗1(x˜1) = u
∗
1(x˜2), which may be questionable in this applica-
tion, Magnac and Thesmar’s exclusion restriction holds and its identification result
applies.12 Its rank condition (7) simplifies to
[Q1(x˜1)−Q1(x˜2)] m 6= 0.
That is, it simply requires that the expected next period’s excess surplus differs
between states x˜1 and x˜2 under continued operation of the bus (choice 1).
Example 5’s analysis of optimal renewal extends to optimal stopping problems
in which stopping ends the decision problem. For example, in Hopenhayn’s (1992)
model of firm dynamics with free entry, active firms solve optimal stopping problems
in which they value exit K at vK = 0. As in Example 5, the fact that v
∗
K(x˜)
is constant in x˜ ensures that the expectation contrast [Q1 − QK ]vK = 0, so that
U1(x˜) = u
∗
1(x˜).
Of course, [Q1−QK ]vK may equal zero even if v∗K(x˜) varies with x˜, in particular
if the state is single action (K) one-period dependent on choices 1 and K.
Example 6. Consider a discrete time, econometric implementation of Dixit’s (1989)
model of firm entry and exit.13 In each period, a firm chooses to either serve the
market (d = 1) or not (d = K = 2). Its payoffs from serving the market depend on
x = (y, d−1), where y is a profit shifter that follows an exogenous Markov process
(that is, y may affect choices but is not controlled by them) and d−1 is the firm’s
choice in the previous period. The entry costs in profit state y˜ equal the difference
between an incumbent’s profit from serving the market and a new entrant’s profit
from doing so, u∗1(y˜, 1) − u∗1(y˜, K), which we assume to be nonnegative. As before,
we set uK = 0, so that the exit costs u
∗
K(y˜, K)− u∗K(y˜, 1) are zero.
The firm’s value v∗K(y
′, k) from choosing inactivity (K) next period after choosing
d = k now may vary with next period’s profit state y′, because the firm will have the
option to reenter the market and this option’s value may depend on y′. However,
because exit costs are zero, this value does not depend on the current choice k:
v∗K(y
′, 1) = v∗K(y
′, K). Moreover, by the assumption that y follows an exogenous
12Since mileage is the only observed state variable in this application, u∗1(x˜1) = u
∗
1(x˜2) requires
that the current payoffs from operating a bus are the same at x˜1 and x˜2 miles, for example because
x˜1 and x˜2 lie on a known flat segment of Harold Zurcher’s cost curve.
13Abbring and Klein (2015) presented this example’s model with state independent entry costs,
code for its estimation, and exercises that can be used in teaching dynamic discrete choice models.
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Markov process, the distribution of y′ given (y, d−1, d = k) is independent of the
current choice k and the past choice d−1, so that
Q1(x˜)vK = E [v∗K(y′, 1) y = y˜] = E [v∗K(y′, K) y = y˜] = QK(x˜)vK (19)
for all x˜ = (y˜, d˜−1) ∈ X . Consequently, as in Example 5, [Q1(x˜) −QK(x˜)]vK = 0
and U1(x˜) = u
∗
1(x˜). Note that, in this case, the state x = (y, d−1) is single action
(K) one-period dependent on choices 1 and K (but generally not on initial states).
An exclusion restriction u∗1(x˜1) = u
∗
1(x˜2) implies (6) and, under rank condition
(7), point identification of β. Because y evolves independently of current and past
choices,
Qk(x˜)m = E [m(y′, k) y = y˜] . (20)
Thus, the rank condition is equivalent to
E [m(y′, 1)−m(y′, K) y = y˜1] 6= E [m(y′, 1)−m(y′, K) y = y˜2] . (21)
It immediately follows that identification requires that y˜1 6= y˜2 in this case. A
difference in lagged choices alone would not suffice, because these do not help predict
next period’s profit state y′ given the current profit state y and choice d = k nor
directly affect next period’s excess surplus.
Moreover, identification fails if entry costs are zero; that is, if u∗1(y˜, 1) = u
∗
1(y˜, K).
In this case, payoffs do not depend on past choices and, more specifically, m(y′, 1) =
m(y′, K). Intuitively, without entry and exit costs, firms can ignore past and future
when deciding on entry and exit and simply maximize the current profits in each
period. Consequently, their entry and exit choices carry no information on their
discount factor. As an aside, note that the entry costs are directly identified from
ln (p1(x˜1)/pK(x˜1))− ln (p1(x˜2)/pK(x˜2)) = u∗1(y˜, 1)− u∗1(y˜, K)
for x˜1 = (y˜, 1) and x˜2 = (y˜, K). Intuitively, for given profit state y˜, lagged choices
only affect current payoffs through the entry costs and have no effect on expected
future payoffs, as is clear from (19) and (20).
Finally, if both y˜1 6= y˜2 and entry costs are strictly positive, (21) will generally be
satisfied. In specific applications, we can verify (21) using that both the distribution
of y′ conditional on y and m(y′, k) = − ln (pK(y′, k)) can directly be estimated from
choice and profit state transition data.
As in Zurcher’s problem, profit states are typically ordered, so that an exclusion
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restriction like u∗1(x˜1) = u
∗
1(x˜2) may be justified as a local shape restriction on the
firm’s utility function. Alternatively, because the firm’s utility is a cardinal payoff,
we may be able to exploit that u∗1(x˜) is known in some state x˜. For example, if
u∗1(x˜) = 0, then (12) holds with k = 1, l = K, and x˜1 = x˜2 = x˜ = (y˜, d˜−1) and
reduces to
ln (p1(x˜))− ln (pK(x˜)) = βE [m(y′, 1)−m(y′, K) y = y˜] ,
so that β is identified if E [m(y′, 1)−m(y′, K) y = y˜] 6= 0. This rank condition is
generally satisfied if entry costs are positive.
In Examples 5 and 6, the rank condition ensures that the shift in expected surplus
contrasts that multiplies β in the right hand side of (12) is nonzero. Because these
examples satisfy one-period dependence, this shift does not depend on β itself, and
this suffices for point identification. More generally, even if the state is not one-
period dependent, strict monotonicity of the right hand side of (12), as in Example
2, suffices for point identification (that is, ensures that a solution is unique if it
exists). It is easy to derive conditions that imply such strict monotonicity, and thus
point identification, and that do not involve β. Without loss of generality— we
can freely interchange states x˜1 and x˜2 and switch choices k and l— we focus on
conditions under which it is strictly increasing or, equivalently, its derivative with
respect to β is positive:14
[Qk(x˜1)−QK(x˜1)−Ql(x˜2) + QK(x˜2)] [I− βQK ]−2 m > 0.
For this, it suffices that
[Qk(x˜1)−QK(x˜1)−Ql(x˜2) + QK(x˜2)] QrKm ≥ 0 for all r ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . .}, (22)
with the inequality strict for at least one r. Like Magnac and Thesmar’s rank
condition (7), these conditions do not depend on β. It is easy to verify that they
hold in Example 2 (which is specified in the Note to Figure 2).
The final example relies on a type of payoff monotonicity that is common in
14Denoting ∆2Q ≡ Qk(x˜1)−QK(x˜1)−Ql(x˜2) +QK(x˜2), we have that
∂
∂β
β∆2Q [I− βQK ]−1m = ∆2Q[I− βQK ]−1m+ β∆2Q∂[I− βQK ]
−1
∂β
m
= ∆2Q[I− βQK ]−1m+ β∆2Q[I− βQK ]−1QK [I− βQK ]−1m
= ∆2Q[I+ (I− βQK)−1βQK ][I− βQK ]−1m = ∆2Q[I− βQK ]−2m.
20
Figure 3: Example of a Dynamic Labor Supply Model that Gives a Monotone Mo-
ment Condition
0 0.80
0
0.4918
β
Note: For J = 3 states, K = 2 choices, k = l = 1, x˜1 = x2, and x˜2 = x1, this graph plots
the left hand side of (6) and (12) (solid black horizontal line) and the right hand sides of (6)
(dashed red line) and (12) (solid blue curve) as functions of β (we switched the roles of x1 and
x2 to ensure a positive choice response and visually line up this example with the others).
The data are generated from Example 7’s stylized dynamic labor supply model, which gives
Q1(x2) =
[
0.00 0.25 0.75
]
, Q1(x1) =
[
0.25 0.75 0.00
]
,
QK =
 1.00 0.00 0.000.50 0.50 0.00
0.00 0.50 0.50
 , p1 =
 0.440.56
0.71
 , and pK =
 0.560.44
0.29
 .
Consequently, the left hand side of (6) and (12) equals ln (p1(x2)/pK(x2)) −
ln (p1(x1)/pK(x1)) = 0.4918. Moreover, m
′ =
[
0.57 0.82 1.23
]
and Q1(x2) −
QK(x2) − Q1(x1) + QK(x1) =
[
0.25 −1.00 0.75 ], so that the slope of the dashed
red line equals [Q1(x2)−QK(x2)−Q1(x1) +QK(x1)]m = 0.2465. A unique value of β,
0.80, solves (12), but (6) has no solution.
models with ordered states.
Example 7. In Eckstein and Wolpin’s (1989) dynamic model of female labor force
participation, women work both to directly earn wages and to invest in work expe-
rience that pays off later. Consider a highly stylized and stationary variant of this
model. Each period, a woman either works (d = 1) or shirks (d = 2 = K). Work
experience takes three levels, “novice” (x1), “learning” (x2), and “seasoned” (x3).
If a woman works and is not yet seasoned, her experience increases one level with
probability 0.75 and stays the same with the complementary probability. If instead
she shirks, and is not a novice, she falls back one level of experience with probability
0.50 and keeps her experience otherwise. Work gives utility u1(x1) = u1(x2) = −0.50
if novice or learning and u1(x3) = 0.50 if seasoned. Women maximize their flow of
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expected utility, discounted with a factor 0.80.
Figure 3 gives the data implied by this example and plots the moment condition
corresponding to the constraint that u1(x1) = u1(x2). This constraint implies that
novices and learning workers earn the same current utility. Nevertheless, work is
more attractive to a learning woman, because she has a good shot at earning the
higher wage for seasoned workers next period if she works now; moreover, unlike
a novice, she may lose experience if she shirks. Seasoned workers, despite the fact
that they cannot further increase their experience, are sufficiently motivated by the
higher earnings and the risk that their human capital depreciates to work even more.
Consequently, pK(x1) > pK(x2) > pK(x3), so that m(x1) < m(x2) < m(x3). More
generally, because QK is increasing, the expected excess surplus after r rounds of
shirking and human capital depreciation, QrKm, is increasing in initial experience.
In this example, the dependence of (the distribution of) a worker’s experience
on initial choices and experience levels does not disappear in a finite number of
periods of, e.g., shirking.15 In particular, experience is not single action (K) one-
period dependent on initial choices in states x1 and x2 and Magnac and Thesmar’s
current value restriction and linear moment condition do not hold. Nevertheless, this
example’s monotonicity ensures that the discount factor is point identified. Because
working, compared to shirking, affects the experience of a learning worker more
than that of a novice with nothing to lose ([Q1(x2)−QK(x2)−Q1(x1) + QK(x1)] =
[0.25 −1.00 0.75]) and QrKm is increasing for all r, (22) holds. Consequently, the
moment condition is monotone in β and has only one solution, 0.80.
3.6 Extension to nonstationary models
Our analysis extends to nonstationary models, such as that in Keane and Wolpin
(1997), with minor modifications. In fact, nonstationary models offer useful identi-
fication strategies that are not available for stationary models. Unlike in stationary
models, an assumption of stationary utilities has identifying power in nonstationary
models. A common version of this argument is that the utilities can be identified
in the last period, say T , so that the discount factor is subsequently identified in
the next to last period (e.g. Yao et al., 2012). This argument assumes stationary
utilities, which can be cast as an exclusion restriction on time as a state variable,
15In a similar context, Altug˘ and Miller (1998) impose such finite dependence by assuming that
wages and the utility cost from work only depend on a finite employment history. Our example
would display single action (K) one-period dependence on initial choices in state x1 and two-period
dependence in state x2 if shirking women would for sure see their experience drop by one level.
Note that this would still not suffice to reduce the moment condition to Magnac and Thesmar’s
linear moment condition.
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i.e. ui,T−1(x˜) = ui,T (x˜), where time shifts the continuation values without shifting
the primitive utilities.
Bajari et al. (2016) used the assumption of stationary utilities to formally es-
tablish identification in a finite-horizon optimal stopping model. Theorem 3 below
extends Bajari et al.’s result beyond optimal stopping problems and also allows for
identification of models with nonstationary utilities.16
Denote time by t ∈ {1, 2, . . . , T}, with terminal period T < ∞, and index u∗k,t,
uk,t, mt, and vk,t by time. For ease of exposition, we maintain the assumption of
stationary Markov transition matrices Qk, but the results extend to nonstationary
distributions. The choice-k specific values now satisfy
vk,t = uk,t + βQk [mt+1 + vK,t+1] (23)
for t = 1, . . . , T − 1; with terminal condition vk,T = uk,T . With the normalization
uK,t = 0 for all t, this gives
ln (pk,t(x˜))− ln (pK,t(x˜)) = u∗k,t(x˜) + β[Qk(x˜)−QK(x˜)][mt+1 + vK,t+1] (24)
for all k ∈ D\{K} and x˜ ∈ X . Finally, using (23) and the normalization uK,t = 0
for all t, we can write the value of the reference choice K as
vK,t =
T∑
τ=t+1
(βQK)
τ−tmτ , (25)
where we use the convention that
∑T
τ=T+1 · = 0 (so that indeed vK,T = uK,T = 0).
Theorem 3. Suppose that
u∗k,t(x˜1) = u
∗
l,t′(x˜2) (26)
for k ∈ D/{K}, l ∈ D, x˜1 ∈ X , x˜2 ∈ X , 1 ≤ t′ < T , and t′ ≤ t ≤ T ; with either
k 6= l, or x˜1 6= x˜2, or t′ < t, or a combination of the three. If either pk,t(x˜1)/pK,t(x˜1) 6=
pl,t′(x˜2)/pK,t′(x˜2) or
[Qk(x˜1)−QK(x˜1)]mt+1 − [Ql(x˜2)−QK(x˜2)]mt′+1 6= 0, (27)
then there are no more than T − t′ points in the identified set.
16Yao et al. showed identification of the discount factor in a dynamic model with continuous
controls under the assumption of stationary utilities and conjectured a similar result for discrete
controls. Theorem 3 proves its conjecture.
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Proof. Differencing (24) corresponding to (26) and substituting in (25) gives
ln (pk,t(x˜1)/pK,t(x˜1))− ln (pl,t′(x˜2)/pK,t′(x˜2)) = (28)
β
(
[Qk(x˜1)−QK(x˜1)]
[ T∑
τ=t+1
(βQK)
τ−t−1mτ
]
−
[Ql(x˜2)−QK(x˜2)]
[ T∑
τ=t′+1
(βQK)
τ−t′−1mτ
])
.
For given choice and transition probabilities, the right hand side of (28) minus its
left hand side is a polynomial of order T − t′ in β. If this polynomial is nonconstant,
then by the fundamental theorem of algebra, it has has up to T − t′ real roots, which
is an upper bound on the number of points in the identified set. To show that (28)
is nonconstant under the stated assumptions, note first that the right hand side of
(28) is zero at β = 0. If the left hand side is nonzero, the polynomial is nonconstant.
If the left hand side is zero, then the rank condition (27) ensures that the derivative
of the right hand side is nonzero at β = 0, so that the right hand side, and thus the
polynomial, is nonconstant.
Rank condition (27) adapts (13) to the nonstationary case. Unlike the station-
ary dynamic choice problem, the nonstationary problem does not require that the
discount factor lies in [0, 1). We leave the definition of the domain of the discount
factor to the reader.
In a study of identification in nonstationary models, Arcidiacono and Miller
(2017) distinguished between identification in long panels, which include the terminal
period, and short panels, which do not. In general, Theorem 3 requires long panels.
However, for models with ρ-period dependence, it also applies to short panels that
extend to at least period t + ρ. For instance, in Zurcher’s renewal problem with a
finite horizon, mileage is still single action (K) one-period dependent, so that the
discount factor can be point identified in short panels until period t+ 1.
4 Empirical content
The previous section focused on identification and gave conditions under which the
primitives can be recovered from the data. In applications, we need to entertain the
possibility that the model is misspecified and did not generate the data to begin
with. It is well known that the unrestricted model has no empirical content: It can
rationalize any choice data {pk,Qk; k ∈ D}. This section shows that the model
under exclusion restrictions can be rejected by data.
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The standard result for the unrestricted stationary model follows from a version
of Magnac and Thesmar’s Proposition 2: For any given data {pk,Qk; k ∈ D}, uK =
0, and β ∈ [0, 1), there exists a unique set of primitive utilities {uk, k ∈ D/{K}}
that rationalizes the data. Specifically, m = − ln pK . Then, vK follows from uK = 0
and (8). Next, by (3), vk = vK +ln pk− ln pK for k ∈ D/{K} ensures that the value
functions are compatible with the choice probability data. In turn, by (4), these value
functions are uniquely generated by the primitive utilities uk = vk − βQk [m + vK ]
for k ∈ D/{K} (note that vK was already set to be consistent with uK = 0).
This result justifies our focus on the identification of the discount factor β in the
previous section: Once the discount factor is identified, we can find unique primitive
utilities that rationalize the data. The empirical consequences of a violation of the
assumed exclusion restriction can manifest themselves in two distinct ways.
First, in some cases, it may be possible to find primitives that satisfy the false
exclusion restriction. If so, these primitives will in general not equal the true prim-
itives. Because we can find primitive utilities that rationalize the data for any
discount factor, the data can be of no help in determining the right restriction in
this case. Instead, we need to argue for the identifying assumption on other grounds.
Second, there may not exist discount factors in their domain that are compatible
with the data under the assumed exclusion restriction. The subset of the possible
data that can be rationalized under an exclusion restriction can be very small. For
instance, in a binary choice model with J = 2 and u∗1(x1) = u
∗
1(x2), the model
cannot generate any state-dependent value contrasts. It follows that this model
cannot rationalize any state-dependent choice data. In empirical practice, this may
force parameter estimates to lie outside their theoretical domains. In turn, this may
lead researchers to statistically reject the model and conclude that at least one of its
assumptions is violated. While some solution methods, such as typical nested fixed
point algorithms, impose the restriction that β ∈ [0, 1), it is easy to use the moment
conditions in (12) for model testing as their computation do not restrict the values
β can take.
The empirical content of the identified model also gives some scope to test
nonnested identifying assumptions against each other. For example, the data in
Example 2 cannot be rationalized under Magnac and Thesmar’s current value re-
striction, but are consistent with an exclusion restriction on primitive utility. Con-
versely, it is easy to construct data that are inconsistent with the primitive utility
restriction, yet can be rationalized by primitives that satisfy the current value re-
striction.
Example 8. Figure 4 displays the left and right hand sides of Magnac and Thesmar’s
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Figure 4: Example of Data that are Consistent with an Exclusion Restriction on
Current Values but Not with One on Primitive Utility
0 0.72
0
0.0800
β
Note: For J = 3 states, K = 2 choices, k = l = 1, x˜1 = x1, and x˜2 = x2, this graph
plots the left hand side of (6) and (12) (solid black horizontal line) and the right hand
sides of (6) (dashed red line) and (12) (solid blue curve) as functions of β. The data are
Q1(x˜1) =
[
0.25 0.25 0.50
]
, Q1(x˜2) =
[
0.00 0.25 0.75
]
,
QK =
 0.90 0.00 0.100.00 0.90 0.10
0.00 1.00 0.00
 , p1 =
 0.500.48
0.10
 , and pK =
 0.500.52
0.90
 .
Consequently, the left hand side of (6) and (12) equals ln (p1(x1)/pK(x1)) −
ln (p1(x2)/pK(x2)) = 0.0800. Moreover, m
′ =
[
0.69 0.65 0.11
]
and Q1(x1) −
QK(x1) − Q1(x2) + QK(x2) =
[ −0.65 0.90 −0.25 ], so that the slope of the dashed
red line equals [Q1(x1)−QK(x1)−Q1(x2) +QK(x2)]m = 0.1116. A unique value of β,
0.72, solves (6), but (12) has no solution.
moment condition in (6) and ours in (12). There is a β ∈ [0, 1) that solves (6), but
the moment condition in (12) cannot be met. Intuitively, the increasingly negative
contribution of the second (value of choice K) term in the right hand side of (12)
limits the possible log choice probability ratio response to the change in states to a
level below the observed response.
In practice, we can easily establish whether given data are consistent with one ex-
clusion restriction or the other by verifying whether the corresponding moment con-
dition, (6) or (12), or its empirical analog has a solution β ∈ [0, 1).
Finally, note that the empirical content of the nonstationary model depends on
the chosen domain of the discount factor. Therefore, we limit our discussion of this
model’s empirical content to noting that Theorem 3 does not guarantee a real root
(and less so one in a specified domain for β) for general choice and state probabilities.
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Figure 5: Example with Two Moment Conditions of Which One Identifies the Dis-
count Factor
0 0.30 0.65
0
0.0187
0.0045
β
Note: For J = 4 states, K = 2 choices, and k = l = 1, this graph plots the left (horizontal
lines) and right hand sides (curves) of (12) as functions of β, for x˜1 = x1 and x˜2 = x2
(corresponding to u1(x1) = u1(x2); dashed red) and x˜1 = x3 and x˜2 = x4 (corresponding to
u1(x3) = u1(x4); solid blue). The data are
Q1 =

0.40 0.26 0.18 0.18
0.33 0.29 0.36 0.27
0.19 0.26 0.18 0.45
0.08 0.18 0.29 0.09
 ,QK =

0.17 0.26 0.13 0.43
0.13 0.07 0.20 0.60
0.20 0.30 0.10 0.40
0.25 0.15 0.50 0.10
 ,
p′1 =
[
0.60 0.59 0.88 0.88
]
, and p′K =
[
0.40 0.41 0.12 0.12
]
.
Consequently, the left hand sides of (12) equal ln (p1(x1)/pK(x1)) − ln (p1(x2)/pK(x2)) =
0.0187 and ln (p1(x3)/pK(x3)) − ln (p1(x4)/pK(x4)) = 0.0045. A unique value of β, 0.30,
solves (12) for x˜1 = x1 and x˜2 = x2 (dashed red). Two values of β solve (12) for x˜1 = x3 and
x˜2 = x4 (solid blue), of which one coincides with the solution to the first moment condition.
5 Multiple exclusion restrictions and inference
Often, more than one exclusion restriction is available. In particular, economic
intuition for an exclusion restriction across states typically suggests the exclusion of
a state variable from the utility function. For example, the state variable x can be
partitioned as (y, z), where z does not affect utilities: uk(y˜, z˜1) = uk(y˜, z˜2) for all
k ∈ D/{K}, y˜, z˜1, and z˜2 > z˜1.17 This typically gives multiple exclusion restrictions
like (11). For example, if choices, y, and z are all binary, we have two exclusion
restrictions, one for each possible value of y.
With multiple exclusion restrictions, point identification can be obtained even if
17We provide a more formal statement of the exclusion of state variables in our discussion of
Fang and Wang in Abbring and Daljord (2019).
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each individual moment condition set identifies β. We give two examples of identi-
fication with two exclusion restrictions.
Example 9. In Figure 5, the moment condition represented by the solid blue line
and curve and the one in red dashes have two and one solutions, respectively. Both
moment conditions are consistent with a discount factor of 0.30, while the solid mo-
ment condition is also consistent with a discount factor of 0.65. The dashed moment
condition by itself point identifies the discount factor, while the solid moment con-
dition only set identifies it. In this case, the solid moment condition is redundant
for point identification.
Example 10. In Figure 6, the dashed red moment condition holds for discount
factors 0.17 and 0.90, while the solid blue moment condition is solved by discount
factors 0.07 and 0.90. Each individual moment condition is consistent with two
discount factors, but only one discount factor solves both moment conditions.
With choice and transition probabilities generated from a model that satisfies
two (or more) exclusion restrictions, the implied two (or more) moment conditions
will always share one solution, the discount factor that was used to generate the
data. We conjecture that, generically, the moments will not share any further so-
lutions, because different choice and transition probabilities, which vary freely with
the primitive utilities, enter the various moment conditions.
Generic point identification is of limited practical value in our context. First, we
are not able to a priori characterize the subset of the model space on which point
identification fails in terms of economic concepts. Though this subset is small, it
may, for all we know, contain economically important models.18
Second, we may not learn whether the discount factor is point or set identified
in finite samples. While finding the shared solutions to multiple moment conditions
is easy if we know the population choice and transition probabilities, locating the
shared solutions in finite samples can be difficult due to sampling variation. This
suggests that we do not insist on point identification, but accept set identification
and use a consistent estimator of the identified set, which may contain one or more
points. Set estimators are easy to implement for single parameter problems. We
give one example.
Example 11. Suppose the population moment conditions are as given in Figure
6. Though each individual moment condition is equally consistent with one small
18For example, Ekeland et al.’s (2004) generic identification result for the hedonic model is
particularly instructive because it shows that identification fails exactly for the linear-quadratic
special case that is at the center of most applied work.
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discount factor, at 0.07 and 0.17, respectively, and one large discount factor at the
true value of 0.90, only the latter is a common solution to both moment conditions.
The discount factor is therefore point identified in this population.
In the top panel of Figure 7, the same two moment conditions are plotted with
sampling variation in the choice data. One sample moment condition is solved by
discount factors 0.16 and 0.91 and the other by discount factors 0.25 and 0.68. The
data do not clearly reveal that the point-identified true discount factor is 0.90. If
anything, the data suggest point identification in the lower region. Even if point
identification cannot be determined a priori without further assumptions, the dis-
count factor is still set identified and we can use consistent set estimators.
Following Chernozhukov et al. (2007) and Romano and Shaikh (2010), suppose
that the identified set B = {β ∈ [0, 1) : S(β) = 0} for some population criterion func-
tion S : [0, 1)→ [0,∞). Note that we can alternatively write B = arg minβ∈[0,1) S(β).
This suggests that we estimate B by a random contour set Cn(s) = {β ∈ [0, 1) :
anSn(β) ≤ s} for some level s > 0 and normalizing sequence {an}, where Sn(β)
is the sample equivalent of S(β) and n is the sample size. For a given confidence
level α ∈ (0, 1), s is set to equal a consistent estimator sn of the α-quantile of
supβ∈B anSn(β), so that the estimator Cn(sn) asymptotically contains the identified
set with probability α:
lim
n→∞
Pr{B ⊆ Cn(sn)} = α.
The bottom panel of Figure 7 illustrates one such estimator. The criterion Sn(β)
is here a quadratic form in the difference between the left and right hand sides of
(12) evaluated at consistent estimators of the choice and transition probabilities
using equal weights. The critical value sn is given as the horizontal line. The
estimated set is Cn(sn) = [0.10, 0.28] ∪ [0.79, 0.91]. The data are equally consistent
with a range of small discount factors and a range of large discount factors, but an
intermediate range (0.28, 0.79) is rejected at the α-level, along with discount factors
smaller than 0.10 and larger than 0.91.
Under some regularity conditions, the set estimator converges to the identified
set as the sample size grows. Since the identified set is a point in this example, in
the limit, the subset of Cn(sn) with small discount factors vanishes and its subset
with large discount factors degenerates to the population discount factor 0.90. While
these set estimators are computationally demanding for parameter spaces with even
just a handful of dimensions, they are easy to implement in a one-dimensional case
such as ours.
29
For point identified problems, standard inference for extremum estimators applies
(e.g. Newey and McFadden, 1994).
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Figure 6: Example with Two Moment Conditions that Jointly Identify the Discount
Factor but Individually Do Not
0 0.17 0.900.07
0
0.0068
0.0019
β
0 0.90
0
0.50
β
Note: For J = 4 states, K = 2 choices, and k = l = 1, the graph in the top panel plots the
left (horizontal lines) and right hand sides (curves) of (12) as functions of β, for x˜1 = x1
and x˜2 = x2 (corresponding to u1(x1) = u1(x2); dashed red) and x˜1 = x3 and x˜2 = x4
(corresponding to u1(x3) = u1(x4); solid blue). The graph in the bottom panel plots the
corresponding squared Euclidian distance between the left and right hand sides of (12) as a
function of β (in multiples of 10−4). The data are
Q1 =

0.43 0.26 0.18 0.18
0.33 0.29 0.36 0.27
0.19 0.26 0.18 0.45
0.05 0.18 0.29 0.09
 , QK =

0.17 0.26 0.13 0.43
0.13 0.07 0.20 0.60
0.20 0.30 0.10 0.40
0.25 0.15 0.50 0.10
 ,
p′1 =
[
0.92 0.92 0.63 0.63
]
, and p′K =
[
0.08 0.08 0.37 0.37
]
.
Consequently, the left hand sides of (12) equal ln (p1(x1)/pK(x1)) − ln (p1(x2)/pK(x2)) =
0.0068 and ln (p1(x3)/pK(x3)) − ln (p1(x4)/pK(x4)) = 0.0019. A unique value of β, 0.90,
solves (12) for both x˜1 = x1 and x˜2 = x2 (dashed red) and x˜1 = x3 and x˜2 = x4 (solid blue).
In addition, each of these two moment conditions has one other solution.
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Figure 7: Example with Two Moment Conditions that Jointly Identify the Discount
Factor but Individually Do Not, Using Noisy Estimates of the Choice Probabilities
0 0.16 0.910.25 0.68
0
0.0066
0.0050
β
0 0.10 0.28 0.79 0.91
0
sn
0.50
β
Note: This figure redraws Figure 6 for the same values of Q1 and QK , but ran-
domly perturbed values of its choice probabilities p1 and pK . Rounded to two digits,
the perturbed choice probabilities equal those reported below Figure 6. Consequently,
the perturbation to m = − lnpK is very small too, so that the right hand sides of
(12) are very close to those plotted in Figure 6. The left hand sides of (12), how-
ever, now equal ln (p1(x1)/pK(x1)) − ln (p1(x2)/pK(x2)) = 0.0066 (instead of 0.0068) and
ln (p1(x3)/pK(x3))− ln (p1(x4)/pK(x4)) = 0.0050 (instead of 0.0019). The resulting moment
conditions again have two solutions. However, they no longer share a common solution and
the squared Euclidian distance in the bottom panel never attains zero. The green shaded
areas highlight the intervals [0.10, 0.28] and [0.79, 0.91] of values of β at which the distance
is below some critical level sn (which is taken to be 0.10× 10−4 in this example).
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Appendix
Identification with general reference utility
Consider the stationary model of Section 2. Suppose that we know uK up to a
constant additive shift; that is, uK = γ1 + u¯K , with γ ∈ R unknown, 1 the J × 1
vector of ones, and u¯K a known J × 1 vector with j-th element u¯K(xj). Then, we
can rewrite (10) as
ln pk − ln pK = β [Qk −QK ] [I− βQK ]−1 (m + u¯K) + uk − γ1− u¯K . (29)
Note that the constant additive shift γ1 drops from the first term, which is a differ-
ence in expectations under choices k and K.
Now suppose that u∗k(x˜1) − u∗l (x˜2) is known, but not necessarily zero, for some
known choices k ∈ D/{K} and l ∈ D, and known states x˜1 ∈ X and x˜2 ∈ X ; with
either k 6= l, x˜1 6= x˜2, or both. This is an exclusion restriction that encompasses
(11) in the main text as a special case. Under this generalized exclusion restriction,
(29) implies
ln (pk(x˜1)/pK(x˜1))− ln (pl(x˜2)/pK(x˜2))−∆2u
= β [Qk(x˜1)−QK(x˜1)−Ql(x˜2) + QK(x˜2)] [I− βQK ]−1 m¯,
(30)
with ∆2u ≡ u∗k(x˜1)−u∗l (x˜2)− u¯K(x˜1) + u¯K(x˜2) and m¯ ≡m+ u¯K known. The factor
multiplying β in the right hand side of (12) can again be interpreted in terms of
incentives related to differences in expected future utilities, which now include the
known utilities derived from the reference choice K. Multiplying these “incentives”
by the discount factor β gives the log choice probability response, corrected for the
known effects of the current utility contrast ∆2u, in the left hand side of (12).
The analysis of the main text applies to this generalization with straightforward
adaptations. In particular, (30) is a moment condition in only one unknown, the
discount factor β, and can be taken directly to data. The following generalization
of Theorem 1 can be proved like that theorem.
Theorem 4. Suppose that u∗k(x˜1) − u∗l (x˜2) is known for some k ∈ D/{K}, l ∈ D,
x˜1 ∈ X , and x˜2 ∈ X ; with either k 6= l, x˜1 6= x˜2, or both. Moreover, suppose that
either the left hand side of (30) is nonzero (that is, pk(x˜1)/pK(x˜1)−pl(x˜2)/pK(x˜2) 6=
∆2u) or a generalization of Magnac and Thesmar’s rank condition (7) holds:
[Qk(x˜1)−QK(x˜1)−Ql(x˜2) + QK(x˜2)] m¯ 6= 0.
33
Then, the identified set B is a closed discrete subset of [0, 1).
A version of Corollary 1 follows directly and so do the simplifications that arise
from finite dependence, in particular those that arise in renewal and optimal stop-
ping problems. Finally, it is easy to adapt the analysis in this appendix to the
nonstationary case. We will not pursue that here.
This appendix (in particular, a comparison of moment conditions (12) and (30))
demonstrates that the analysis in the main text extends
• without change to the case in which u∗K(x) equals a (not necessarily zero or
even known) constant;
• with a simple, known adjustment to the choice probability response in the left
hand side of (12) to the case that u∗k(x˜1)−u∗l (x˜2) is known, but not necessarily
zero; and
• with another such adjustment to the left hand side of (12) and a known ad-
justment to the polynomial in the right hand side of (12) if u∗K is only known
up to a constant additive shift, but not necessarily constant.
This shows that our analysis can directly be applied to problems in which a state
independent reference utility exists (as is typically assumed in applied work) and
directly complements results on the identification of more general reference utility
specifications.
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